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7

ASSESSING METACOGNITION:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE
BUROS SYMPOSIUM
Gregory Schraw
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln

This chapter attempts to consolidate the diverse opinions and
conclusions included in the previous six chapters of this volume. I
have found it easiest to do so in three sections. Section 1 provides a
summary the book's main themes. These themes pertain to the need
for a more comprehensive theory of metacognition, the disparity
between metacognitive theory and measurement, methodological
questions about the measurement of metacognitive processes, concerns about poor instrumentation, the generality of the metacognition
construct, and issues pertaining to educational practice. Section 2
raises concerns central to the measurement community in general.
These concerns include questions about the reliability and validity of
assessment techniques and paper-and-pencil measures. Another
concern is the need for dependable performance assessment of
metacognitive skills among younger and older students. Section 3
makes a number of suggestions for future research and measurement
practice based on current theory. A number of educational implications are discussed as well.
Six Emergent Themes

Most researchers studying metacognition agree that it is important to study, but difficult to measure. The chapters included in this
volume provide a variety of strategies to bridge the gap between
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metacognitive theory and measurement practice. I believe there are
six discernable themes that emerge from these chapters that, collectively, point the field in a sensible direction for further research and
discussion.
Theme 1: The need for a comprehensive, unified theory of metacognition.
Throughout this volume, there are repeated references to two compatible, yet theoretically distinct, theories of metacognition associated
with the work of John Flavell (1987) and Ann Brown (1987). Most
experts, including those represented in this volume, view this as a
serious problem because it prevents researchers from agreeing upon
basic metacognitive processes and terminology for those processes. The
terminology problem is especially important because many researchers
describe the same basic processes using somewhat different terms.
However, all the contributors to this volume, as well as other
theorists not included (Chi, 1987; Garner, 1987, 1994; Nelson & Narens,
1994; Metcalfe, 1994a), agree on the primacy of three overarching
processes I refer to as regulatory control, performance monitoring, and
task monitoring. The former refers to a variety of self-regulatory
processes used to actively, and often intentionally, control cognitive
activity. Many of these activities have been described in detail in
related volumes on self-regulated performance (Schunk &
Zimmerman, 1994; Zimmerman & Schunk, 1989) and reading
(Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995; Pressley, Harris, & Guthrie, 1992).
Performance monitoring refers to monitoring ongoing comprehension via either self-report or various subjective measures (see
Schraw, Wise, & Roos, this volume). Task monitoring refers to
assessing the demands of the task at hand, especially its difficulty
relative to one's own skills and knowledge (see Borkowski, Chan,
& Muthukrishna, this volume).
A great deal of discussion centers around these processes either
directly or indirectly. Most chapter authors believe the three processes
are related in a reciprocal, interactive fashion, forming a triarchic set of
basic metacognitive processes (Pintrich, Wolters, & Baxter, this volume).
There are several explicit mentions of the relationship between control
and performance monitoring, a relationship Schraw et al. (this volume) refer to as a regulatory loop. Borkowski et al. (this volume) also
address the crucial relationship between task monitoring and conh'ol,
especially among younger students and older students who find academic work quite difficult (Borkowski & Thorpe, 1994).
A closely related problem is the fuzzy boundary that separates
overlapping constructs such as metacognition, executive processes,
and self-regulation (Pintrich et al., this volume; Zimmerman, 1994).
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Although little is said about this issue directly, there is some discussion regarding the relationship between metacognition and motivational variables. These authors generally agree that motivation is an
important contributor to metacognition, although it is less clear whether
it is part of metacognition per se (see Garcia & Pintrich, 1994 and
Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider, 1987 for related discussions).
Theme 2: There is a large discrepancy between metacognitive theory
and measurement practice. Chapter authors unanimously agreed that
metacognition is an important theoretical construct that warrants
serious attention. They also agreed that measurement aspects of
metacognition typically are included as an afterthought. Most researchers are interested in measuring metacognition only as far as
those measurements can be used to evaluate metacognitive theory or
improve instructional practice. This perspective limits focus on the
integrity of the measurement process apart from how it impacts
metacognitive theory.
Reducing the gap between metacognitive theory and measurement practice depends in part on the success of establishing a comprehensive theory of metacognition that researchers can use as a common
referent point (see Theme 1). It also depends on researchers' willingness to become conversant with contemporary measurement theory
and to value the integrity of one's measurement instruments as much
as one's metacognitive theory. This is a tall order at the present, given
that many researchers interested in metacognition have limited training in psychometric theory, little interest per se in measurement, and
tend to view measurement as an unglamorous means to a more
impressive theoretical end.
Theme 3: There is considerable debate regarding the relative pros and
cons of different assessment methodologies. As in any contemporary
debate on research, this volume present differing views regarding the
utility of qualitative and quantitative methods. Pressley (this volume)
presents a careful argument for the increased use of qualitative
methods such as grounded theory approaches Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
According to Pressley (this volume), researchers have privileged
access to the thoughts and strategies used by individuals as they
perform a task or reflect on their performance.
Others were less positive about qualitative approaches, however
voicing traditional concerns summarized in Ericsson and Simon (1993)
and Pressley and Afflerbach (1995). These include the potentially
intrusive nature of interviews, the possibility that individuals do not
have privileged access to their own cognitive processes, and the
possibility that individuals will provide biased reports of their activi-

300

SCHRAW

ties. Nevertheless, all of the contributors to this volume agreed that
both traditions have strengths and weaknesses, and do not guarantee
informative or accurate assessment. More importantly, there was
strong agreement that any method is superior to no method at all!
The most reasonable strategy at this point is to recognize the problem,
then turn our attention to the daunting task of unifying metacognitive
theory and constructing reliable and valid methods for evaluating
that theory.
Another methodological subtheme concerned what several authors referred to as grain size; that is, the specificity of the task that is
being assessed (Howard-Rose & Winne, 1993; Pintrich et al., this
volume). Pressley (this volume), for example, described ongoing
research of an extremely broad grain size-no less than an exhaustive
taxonomy of strategies used during highly constructive reading.
Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) reported over 150 separate strategies.
Tobias and Everson (this volume) reported studies of much smaller
grain size; that is, the accuracy of specific monitoring judgments. The
process model described by Borkowski et al. (this volume) necessitated a number of assessments, each of differing grain sizes.
The issue of grain size is important for two reasons. One is that
bigger grains become increasingly dependent on longitudinal, qualitative methods, although it is possible to use sophisticated quantitative methods such as structural equation modelling as well. In
contrast, very small grains seem easier to study with traditional
quantitative methods such as reaction and choice selection times,
recognition and recall measures, or calibrated accuracy judgments.
One potential drawback, however, is that small-grain processes may
be so automatic, individuals may no longer have privileged access to
performance, precluding the use of introspective measures.
Grain size also affects the degree to which measurements provide
a useful test of meta cognitive theory or educational interventions. For
example, although studying the acquisition of a specific strategy is
crucial (see Borkowski et al., this volume), such information would
not be sufficient to assess the validity of the process models described
by Pressley and Afflerbach (1995) or Borkowski et al. (this volume).
A third methodological subtheme concerned what kind of
metacognitive processes individuals choose to study. The general
consensus was that small-grain processes (e.g., monitoring strategies)
vary among different groups and ages, and that one model of
metacognition may not apply to all individuals. On the other hand,
studying monitoring processes in experts and novices may lead to
different results (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Glenberg & Epstein, 1987). The
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current volume does not offer a resolution to this paradox. I believe
that researchers will have to make a greater effort to construct a
comprehensive developmental model of metacognition as opposed to
a purely descriptive account of what the average college sophomore
does. Clearly, models are needed in which expert and novice performance can be reconciled.
At this point, there continue to be important differences of opinion regarding how to measure metacognition. This issue must be
resolved before substantial progress can be made in the field. Specifically, researchers must at least agree on what constitutes necessary
and sufficient evidence for assessing the validity of metacognitive
constructs, even if researchers continue to disagree about the methods
they use to collect evidence. Pintrich, Wolters, and Baxter (this
volume) make a number of important suggestions in this regard
based on the work of Messick (1989).
Theme 4: Most available instruments that measure metacognition have
unknown psychometric properties. Both Pintrich et al. (this volume) and
Baker and Cerro (this volume) suggested that most measures of
metacognition can be characterized by two salient features: (a) they were
constructed for use within a specific study and (b) there is little or no
normative information about them even within the population for
which they were designed. There are two measurement-related consequences. One is tllat the dimensionality of the insh'uments (i.e., what
psychomeh'icians would refer to as an instrument's factor structure) is
unknown. This prevents researchers from identifying the number and
type of psychological constructs the instrument presumably measures.
Second, there often is no information regarding how the hypothesized
construct is related to other relevant performance outcomes.
There are several instruments that prove exceptions to this rule.
One is the Learning and Study Strategies Inventory (LASSI) developed by Weinstein, Zimmerman, and Palmer (1988), which reports 10
separate subscales, including attitude, motivation, anxiety, test strategies, and self-testing. Although the LASSI has acceptable internal
consistency measures for each scale (i.e., _ = .70 to .80), and correlates
with measures of cognitive performance, it is unclear whether it
measures meta cognition per se, or cognitive skills such as study
strategies that are regulated with the help of metacognitive knowledge. Another instrument is the Motivated Strategies for Learning
Questionnaire (MSLQ) (Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich, Smith,
Garcia, & McKeachie, 1993), which measures both motivational and
strategy subscales. A third scale is the Metacognitive Assessment
Inventory (MAl) (Schraw & Dennison, 1994), which includes know l-
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edge of cognition and regulation of cognition subscales. Although the
MAl has extremely high reliability, its relationship to other cognitive
measures remains to be investigated.
As this list indicates, all of these instruments have been developed
within the last decade, and most are fewer than five years old. Initial
results seem promising, and there is complete agreement that all of
these instruments represent positive steps in the assessment of basic
metacognitive knowledge. However, as Pressley and Afflerbach
(1995) point out, paper-and-pencil inventories are no substitute for
more in-depth analyses of metacognitive knowledge. Second, inventories alone seem incapable of capturing the complex dynamics of
metacognitive regulation. Third, all of these instruments are intended
for use with adolescents and adults; thus, instrumentation is needed
for younger learners.
Theme 5: There is uncertainty (and discomfort) regarding the domaingenerality of metacognition. The degree to which metacognition constitutes a domain-general phenomenon remains an important question.
The basic issue is this: If metacognition is really a function of expertise, and therefore is domain-specific, can it be measured at all using
a domain-general instrument such as the LASSI, MSLQ, or MAl? An
equally pressing problem is how to test whether metacognition is a
domain-general phenomenon? Several studies have addressed this
question either directly or indirectly. Glenberg and Epstein (1987), for
instance, found a negative relationship between expertise and monitoring. Music experts monitored more poorly than physics experts on
a test of music principles whereas the reverse was true on a physics
test! Morris (1 990) found that domain knowledge was unrelated to
monitoring proficiency even though it was related to one's ability to
answer questions effectively in that domain. However, Maki and
Serra (1992) found that monitoring improved as individuals acquired
more information from the to-be-Iearned materials. These studies
provided indirect, as well as conflicting, evidence about the domainspecific nature of metacognitive knowledge and regulation.
A more direct study was conducted by Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen,
and Roedel (1 995). In the first of two experiments, individuals
completed eight multiple-choice tests that varied with respect to
content domain, overall difficulty, number of items, inferential difficulty, and number of distractors. Despite the heterogeneity of these
tests, confidence judgments were correlated in the neighborhood of r
= .50 among all tests even when performance was controlled statistically. Monitoring accuracy and discrimination scores (i.e., the ability
to discriminate between correct and incorrect answers) were also
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correlated. However, in Experiment 2, where all five tests were
matched on length, difficulty, and test-item format, monitoring accuracy and discrimination scores were correlated even when performance was controlled. Schraw et al. (1995) concluded that monitoring
accuracy and discrimination were attributable to two processes that
included domain-specific expertise and knowledge that supports
performance, and domain-general regulatory strategies such as selfchecking that supports self-regulation.
Of course, all of the studies described in this section investigated
metacognitive processes of limited grain size (i.e., comprehension
monitoring). Thus, even though there is evidence that comprehension monitoring relies in part on domain-general metacognitive knowledge, it does not follow that other metacognitive processes (e.g.,
planning, and allocation of cognitive resources) are domain-general.
The theoretical and educational implications of future research in
this area are crucial in my opinion. One implication of data consistent
with the domain-general view is that educators may feel more confident teaching domain-general metacognitive skills, rather than skills
that are encapsulated within specific domains such as mathematics
and reading (see Fodor, 1983; Gardner, 1983; and Hirschfeld & Gelman,
1994, for opposing views). A second implication is that researchers
must inquire about the development of domain-general skills. One
intriguing explanation has been proposed by Karmiloff-Srnith (1992)
who hypothesized that domain-specific skills and knowledge are
merged over time across domains to create domain-general knowledge. Understanding the underlying cognitive mechanisms that
enable this development is a worthy topic in and of itself.
Theme 6: Difficulty relating metacognitive theory to educational practice. One often heard complaint is that there are too few proven
methods for improving metacognition among children and adolescents. Baker and Cerro (this volume) point to a number of successes,
including Palincsar and Brown (1984), Paris and colleagues (Cross &
Paris, 1988; Jacobs & Paris, 1987), and Pressley and colleagues (Brown
& Pressley, 1994; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992). Nevertheless,
Baker and Cerro also are outspoken about theorists' willingness to
make snap educational recommendations without any evidence to
support their claims. In fact, most training studies have reported
modest, yet lasting, gains only after intensive instruction lasting from 6
weeks to 6 months (Delclos & Harrington, 1991; King, 1991, 1992).
Another major problem is the almost complete lack of standardized assessment guidelines for use in the classroom or in research
settings, especially when evaluating younger learners. One notable
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study in tills regard was Swanson (1990), who found that metacognitive
knowledge among fifth and sixth graders facilitated problem solving.
Swanson also suggested that metacognitive regulation may develop
independent of skills traditionally measured on aptitude tests, although tills controversial claim requires additional research. To
assess metacognition, Swanson administered a 20-question verbal
interview, tapping student's knowledge about self-regulation.
Swanson also provided extensive documentation for scoring the
interview, although with the exception of Corkill and Koshida (1993),
others have not capitalized on these guidelines.
SUMMARY

The six themes related to the theory and practice of metacognition
provide an ambitious agenda for future theory development, research, and educational practice. It seems clear that a new agenda is
in order. Indeed, it is conceivable that the construct of metacognition
may lose its appeal to practitioners, and its theoretical relevance, if
researchers do not provide a much greater degree of psychometric
rigor during the next decade. There are several salient issues facing
researchers. One is to construct a comprehensive theory that includes well-specified subcomponents. A second is to agree on what
kinds of evidence are necessary to validate this theory. A third is to
construct standardized procedures using qualitative and quantitative methods to assess metacognitive competencies. A fourth is to
design and test interventions to improve or remediate important
meta cognitive competencies. A fifth is to propose standards by
willch these interventions can be evaluated.
Thoughts from the Measurement Community

Not everyone is excited by terms like metacognition and selfregulation. As recently as the mid-1980s, many people felt that
metacognition was too broad and elusive to be studied effectively.
One common complaint, and the driving force behind the symposium, is that some theorists interested in metacognition have neither
the training or inclination to establish sound psychometric underpinnings to measures of the construct.
In tills spirit, there are several cautions that one might expect to
hear from testing and measurement experts. Although these cautions
parallel the six themes described above, they provide a view of the
problem from a somewhat different perspective.
Caution 1: The field needs a plan for comprehensive assessment of the
construct. Test authors would quickly point to the testing industry to
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make their case. Aptitude tests, for example, come in virtually every
size and shape imaginable. Th ese tests typically provide reliability and
validity norms, and endeavor to meet all the standard evaluative criteria
proposed by measurement theorists such as the Standards for Educational
and Psychological Testing (AREA, APA, & NCME, 1985). Notwithstanding the continuing debate about the validity of aptitude tests, and
the role that aptitude plays in learning (see Jensen, 1992, and Sternberg,
1986, for different views), modern testing as we know it would not be
possible without an overarching plan for translating aptitude theory
into instruments that can be evaluated with exacting care.
Caution 2: Generate and test models. Researchers have failed for the
most part to translate metacognitive theory into testable models. In
this view, a theory provides a method for systematically organizing a
body of knowledge that explains a particular set of phenomena
(Byrnes, 1992; Kuhn, 1989; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Every theory
has at least two distinguishable parts; a formal aspect (i.e., postulates
about how a phenomenon occurs) and an empirical aspect (Le., a test of
those postulates, usually in the form of data or mathematical proofs).
A model provides a formal description of a theory by specifying the
relationships among its most important postulates. These descriptions often take the form of a diagram, flow chart, or summary table.
Models are convenient ways to operationalize a theory and enable
researchers to test one part of the theory at a time. Models are useful
in that a theory can be tested and modified without discarding the
entire model.
Both Flavell (1987) and Brown (1987) proposed descriptive theories of metacognition that, although overlapping, remain somewhat
independent of one another. Surprisingly, very few researchers have
attempted to translate these theories into operational models that
enable researchers to investigate systematically the relationships among
model components. Two important exceptions are the models proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990, 1994) and Borkowski and colleagues (Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992; Borkowski & Thorpe,
1994; Borkowski et al., this volume). These models enable researchers
to make explicit predictions about the relationships among control
and monitoring processes, one's extant knowledge base, and motivational factors that affect self-regulation.
Process models clearly play an important role in theory testing.
Models specify particular relationships that can be tested explicitly.
Of equal importance, models focus our attention on the role that
instrumentation and measurement play in theory testing. The advent
and continued growth of structural equation modeling, for example,
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has ushered in a new era in the measurement of salient constructs in
cognitive psychology. Such models require researchers to test not
only the structural aspects of the model (i.e., relationships among
model components predicted by theory), but measurement aspects as
well (Bollen, 1989).
Caution 3: Construct and evaluate instruments that assess specific
components of the model. Three questions seem especially germane to
this caution. These include: (a) What is the construct of interest? (b)
Do appropriate measures exist to measure it? and (c) Does the
measurement process change the construct? Each of these questions
is considered briefly.
What is the construct? Broad constructs are difficult to measure,
making it unlikely that there will ever be a single measure of
metacognition (see Pintrich et al., this volume; Schraw, 1995). An
alternative approach would be to partition the metacognition construct into smaller components, then hypothesize about the relationships among subcomponents, although others may disagree with this
strategy (Linn, 1991). Constructing a detailed structural model that
specifies individual components and their interrelationships is an
essential precursor to the validation process.
Do appropriate measures exist? Once potentially measurable subcomponents have been defined, researchers must select behavioral
and self-report indices that measure these components. Indices of
metacognitive activity should be evaluated in an ongoing manner
using a variety of approaches (see Crocker & Algina, 1986, chapter 4,
for a summary of this process). Potential measures need to be
evaluated with respect to reliability, validity, and utility, or their
qualitative counterparts such as credibility and authenticity (Creswell,
1994; Merriam, 1988; Miles & Huberman, 1984).
Two aspects of reliability are essential. One concerns the internal
consistency of an instrument. Measures such as coefficient alpha
provide easy-to-compute indices of internal consistency and are available for a variety of measures of meta cognitive knowledge and
performance (Pintrich et al., 1993; Schraw & Dennison,1994; Weinstein
et al., 1988). However, when used in isolation, coefficient alpha is
insufficient. A second aspect of reliability is consistency over time.
Currently, there is little available information regarding test-retest
reliability on commonly used measures of self-regulation and
metacognition.
Multiple aspects of validity are crucial to the effective use and
interpretation of scores from an instrument or experimental results.
In their chapter, Pintrich et al. (this volume) addressed the question of
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validity using Messick's (1989) five-component framework. In this
view, all questions of validity are essentially questions related to
construct validity (Le., the degree to which inferences about a score
accurately represent an observable or unobservable phenomenon of
interest). Given that Messick views each of these five components as
interrelated, threats to any component necessarily affect all others.
A similar argument can be made for the credibility of qualitative
methods. Whether researchers use terms such as utility or confirmability
is beside the point; rather, they must demonstrate that they have
explained a hypothetical construct (or phenomenon) in an accurate,
replicable way. Researchers with a predilection for either qualitative
or quantitative methods should conduct carefully planned validation
studies to assure their methods accurately describe the phenomenon
of interest. In particular, there is a tremendous need for studies
evaluating the convergent and divergent validity of scores from
multiple measures, preferably using multiple methodologies, to explain metacognitive phenomena. Point 3 made by Pintrich et al. (this
volume), in which they recommended the use of a multitrait,
multimethod approach to construct validation, emphasized this concern directly.
Does the measurement process change the construct? Researchers
must ask themselves to what extent their measures of metacognition
affect the deployment of metacognitive knowledge and regulatory
skills. Although there are a variety of potential measurement confounds, several that I consider to be especially serious are discussed
below (see Baker & Cerro, this volume). The first is that self-report
inventories (e.g., Schraw & Dennison, 1994) may elicit socially desirable responses. One way to safeguard against instrument bias is to
conduct convergent and divergent validity studies. Unfortunately,
few studies of this kind have been reported.
A second potential problem is that think-aloud studies may
affect the measurement of metacognitive processes by competing for
limited resources that are necessary for task performance. One option
is to use retrospective self-reports; however, verbal report theorists
generally view retrospective reports as less reliable than concurrent selfreports. Competition for limited resources also affects many quantitative studies, but especially those using on-line confidence judgments of
performance. One alternative is to use unobh'usive measures such as
computerized testing procedures (Schraw et al., this volume).
A third problem is that structured interviews may provide information to individuals that they would not report on their own,
thereby masking their true metacognitive knowledge. One option is
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to ask iniormants to respond in writing, although this leads to other
problems such as competition for limited resources.
A fourth problem, and the most serious in my opinion, is that
individuals may differ in terms of their ability to explain or estimate
their metacognitive knowledge either verbally or in writing. For
example, experts may have a richer vocabulary for describing their
mental processes, even though novices engage in similar processes.
In essence, this problem is due to aptitude by treatment interactions,
and must be considered carefully when researchers evaluate potential
threats to the validity of their findings.
Caution 4: Use diverse assessment methods. Pintrich et al. (this
volume) captured the main theme of the Buros Symposium when
they concluded there is no one-size-fits-all measure of metacognition.
Indeed, if we accept the premise that there are two or more distinct
metacognitive processes (e.g., control and monitoring), it seems reasonable to conclude that there must be different measures of these
processes. Equally reasonable is the assumption that each identifiable
metacognitive process can be measured using different instruments
and methodologies (see Borkowski et al., this volume).
Perhaps the best advice one could give researchers interested in
metacognition is to adopt a multitrait, multimethod (MTMM) model
of assessment along the lines first proposed by Campbell and Fiske
(1959), and elaborated upon by Cook and Campbell (1979). The
MTMM approach emphasizes the collection of multiple measures of
a phenomenon using multiple, preferably diverse, methodologies. In
the context of validating metacognitive theory, this means using
objective self-reports (Pintrich et al., this volume), subjective selfreports such as concurrent verbal reports (Pressley, this volume),
subjective assessments of one's thinking or performance such as
calibration judgments (Tobias & Everson, this volume), and unobtrusive measures such as item selection times using computer-based
testing (Schraw et al., this volume) . Other measurement approaches
are needed as well, such as neurophysiological correlates of
meta cognition (Metcalfe, 1994b).
Summary

The four cautions outlined above summarize basic measurement
concerns for any research agenda. They have special importance for
the domain of metacognitive research given the paucity of systematic
validation studies. Foremost, the field needs a systematic and comprehensive assessment agenda, lest it lose its credibility among psy-
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chologists and educators in general, and measurement experts in
particular. A major part of this agenda should include the development of a testable model of metacognition. Work in this direction was
described by Borkowski et al. (this volume). Second, working models
must be tested and refined in an ongoing basis. Earlier stages of this
research will undoubtedly focus on specific components of
metacognition, whereas the later stages may test multicomponent
models using procedures such as structural equation modeling; that
is, the grain size of these studies would be expected to change over
time. Third, a variety of measures should be used to assess each
separate component, as well as the entire model. Last, adopting a
multitrait, multimethod approach to model testing may enhance the
effectiveness of this research.
An Agenda for Future Research

There are many ways that the assessment of metacognition can be
improved in the future, but it is not an easy task, and it cam10t be done
without the help of colleagues in different fields of study. This section
makes seven suggestions for future research and practice based on the
cautions described above. I have rank ordered these suggestions in a
way that might surprise some readers. Regardless of their ordering,
all are essential to the advancement of the field, and should be taken
seriously.
Suggestion 1: Researchers interested in metacognition must collaborate
with measurement and instructional design experts. Most of the authors
included in this volume would acknowledge their lack of technical
measurement expertise. Most of them, and most researchers working
in the area of metacognition, are not keenly interested in measurement issues per se. Many, including myself, do not have a strong
interest in the design of instructional interventions. Yet it is clear to
me that failing to involve measurement and instructional design
experts may be disastrous to the field. I believe we are at an impasse
that cannot be overcome without the skills and knowledge of experts
who do not share our vested interest in the construct of metacognition.
On a brighter note, let me focus on some of the potential advantages of cross-disciplinary collaborations. One is that experts at
solving measurement problems may add a tremendous amount of
richness to existing theory. A second is that measurement and
instructional design experts may provide innovative ways to assess
metacognition, both with respect to objective paper-and-pencil measures, as well as performance-based assessments. A third is that
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instructional design experts have much to offer by way of translating
metacognitive theory into instructional practice. The same may be
said regarding how to evaluate formative and summative instructional outcomes.
Suggestion 2: Agree on a unified theoretical framework. It bears
repeating that the field is perceived by some outsiders as too theoretically disparate. It is unlikely that substantially more progress will be
made until researchers agree on what it is they are looking for. My
personal preferences are for a three-component model of metacognition
that emphasizes the role of regulatory control, performance monitoring, and task-monitoring processes. Such a model is already consistent with much of the theorizing being done in meta cognition and
self-regulation (Baker, 1989; Borkowski et al., this volume; Garner,
1987; Garner & Alexander, 1989; Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Nelson &
Narens, 1994; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pressley & Afflerbach, 1995;
Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Even earlier theories such as those
proposed by Brown (1987) and Flavell (1987) that postulate two main
components, are highly consistent with the three-component view.
It is my view that the most important issue separating existing
accounts of metacognition is terminological differences, not assumptions about basic metacognitive processes. In a way, it is as if the field
has agreed on what kind of pizza it wants to eat, but still can't decide
how to slice the pieces! I believe we are much closer to a comprehensive theory of metacognition than most casual observers would give
us credit for. Perhaps our greatest challenge is to recognize the
perception of disarray from outside the field and to resolve it!
Another theory-related suggestion is to focus on measuring the
practical and statistical relationships among the three main components described above. Recent work by Nelson and Narens (1990,
1994) and Koriat (1993, 1994) have raised extremely important questions about the relationship between monitoring and control. The
importance of this relationship, as well as ways to test it, were echoed
by Schraw et al. (this volume). Borkowski et al. (this volume) also
emphasized the relationship between performance and task monitoring.
Suggestion 3: Identify suitable outcome measures that can be used as
criteria to evaluate metacognitive behaviors. Most of the work done in the
field of metacognition has been devoted to generating theory. A
sizable amount of work also has been done on testing a narrow band
of metacognitive processes, but especially comprehension monitoring
(See Baker, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990; and Schraw & Moshman,
1995, for reviews). Some work, but not a great deal, has been done on
instructional improvement (Brown & Pressley, 1994; Jacobs & Paris,
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1987; King, 1991; Brown & Palincsar, 1989). Yet virtually no attention
has been paid to identifying suitable outcome measures of
metacognition, other than as they apply to testing components of
metacognitive theories, or evaluating the efficacy of instructional
interventions.
Of particular concern are measures with a high degree of ecological validity, including performance-based measures that capture midrange (e.g., 3 months) and long-term (e.g., 6 months or more)
development of metacognition. There are not any suitable methods in
this regard at the present time, and unfortunately, few researchers
seem to have considered this problem (see Baker & Cerro, this
volume, and Garner, 1987, for further discussion).
Outcome measures should be identified that meet a variety of
needs. One especially important need is to parallel measures of
metacognition that are suitable for children and adults. Without such
measures, comparisons among age groups at a single time are compromised, as are across-time comparisons within the same group. A
second need is to identify measures that are suitable for field settings.
Many studies rely on either checklists or overt behavioral measures.
Lacking is a method for identifying multiple levels of metacognitive
activity via self-report. A third need is to construct specific versus
broad measures of metacognition. Most shldies focus on monitoring
judgments made prior to or after completing a test item. Although
monitoring reflects an important component of metacognition, it fails
to provide information about strategies for planning, debugging, or
evaluating.
Another important question to ask about these measures is the
degree to which they intrude on metacognitive processes. Asking
individuals to think-aloud as they perform a task, for example, may
interfere with that task by consuming limited resources, or it may
facilitate metacognitive behaviors by calling explicit attention to task
demands.
Suggestion 4: Empirically investigate the relationship among different
outcome measures. One consequence of the small amount of work that
has gone into identifying alternative outcome measures is that very
little is known about the relationship among these measures. For
example, there has not been a systematic comparison of the relationship between ratings of monitoring accuracy and self-reported strategies, even though these measures are used frequently in the literature.
As measurement experts would remind us, the more measures we use
to assess an outcome, and the more we know about the relationship
among these measures, the better able we are to make reliable and
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valid inferences about the construct under study. Put simply, it is crucial
to converge on a consh·uct using multiple, triangulated methods.
Suggestion 5: Establish methodological and data-analytic guidelines for
measuring metacognition. Any research tradition quickly establishes its
own informal or formal guidelines for administering and interpreting
a task. One example is the use of monitoring accuracy judgments that
pervade the metacognition literature. Nevertheless, with the exception of monitoring accuracy judgments (see Tobias & Everson, this
volume), error-detection (see Baker & Cerro, this volume), and selfreported strategy use (see Pressley, this volume), there are few guidelines available for either researchers or practitioners. This is a serious
obstacle for educators who want to improve metacognition in the
classroom. One difficulty is understanding what metacognition is, a
problem that is due in part to too much theoretical and terminological
slippage. Another problem is selecting a benchmark for measuring
the growth of metacognition (see Suggestion 3 above). A third
problem is deciding on a method for assessing metacognitive progress.
My observations have led me to conclude that teachers and parents
typically assess meta cognitive growth using intuitive hunches rather
than tangible outcome measures. This is due to at least three factors:
(a) uncertainty about what to look for; (b) the lack of meaningful, costefficient measurement strategies; and (c) the lack of meaningful
interpretative guidelines.
The lack of procedural and interpretative guidelines is a serious
problem within and beyond the field of metacognition. Within the
field, there are few established procedures for measuring metacognitive
knowledge. Of the three most widely used paper-and-pencil instruments (i.e., the LASSl, MSLQ, and MAl), only the LASSl has been
used enough to provide relatively stable norms for different types of
students. Most studies continue to use instruments designed specifically for the study at hand. Many studies that used the LASSl, MSLQ,
or MAl also have fairly small sample sizes (i.e., less than 100), that
preclude a meaningful replication of previous studies. To complicate
matters, very few studies ever report reliability coefficients for criterion measures, and few researchers have enough measurement and
statistical savvy to understand the subtle, yet important, differences
among alternative data-analytic strategies once data have been collected (Keren, 1991; Schraw, 1995).
Another issue concerns the purpose of metacognitive assessment
(Baker & Cerro, this volume). Information gathered during an assessment can be used for different purposes (Tindal & Marston, 1990).
One purpose is to make placement decisions, such as whether a
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student is admitted to a restricted program. A second purpose is to
make diagnostic judgments regarding a specific skill or learning
disability. A third purpose is to use the information to provide
ongoing feedback to students, parents, and teachers. A fourth purpose is to provide summative evaluation at the end of an instructional
unit or training session. Whereas most researchers used measures of
metacognition as summative indices of unobservable metacognitive
competencies, most educators are interested in metacognition from a
diagnostic and formative evaluation perspective. There has been very
little thought given to bridging the gap between researchers and
theorists on the one hand, and practitioners on the other. I believe
researchers have a responsibility to bridge this gap and to address
how educators can collect information about a student's skills in a
manner that enables the educator to provide useful formative feedback. Similarly, many teachers hunger for guidelines for diagnosing
potential learning difficulties related to lack of cognitive and
metacognitive regulation.
Suggestion 6: Establish guidelines for implementing and evaluating
instruction. Metacognitive theory has not been translated adequately
into educational practice. This sentiment was captured well by Baker
(1989), Garner (1987), and Baker and Cerro (this volume). Few
teachers have a clear sense of how to improve metacognition and
meta memory, or even ways to enhance the growth of specific subcomponents of metacognition such as conditional knowledge, although some educators are quite skilled in this regard. Educators
desire guidelines for helping their students become more
metacognitively aware. These guidelines should explicate separate
subcomponents of metacognition (e.g., conditional knowledge, monitoring) as specifically as possible, and propose specific instructional
interventions that improve these skills. Researchers also must propose guidelines for assessing the growth of metacognitive skills.
A number of researchers have investigated the kind of instructional interventions I am describing (Brown & Pressley, 1994; Delclos
& Harrington, 1991; King, 1991; Paris & Jacobs, 1987; Palincsar &
Brown, 1989; Zimmerman & Martinez-Pons, 1990). Many of these
interventions have focused on teaching specific strategies (e.g., identifying main ideas) and monitoring their use. Others have proposed
a broader research agenda (Garner, 1990; Pressley, Harris, & Marks,
1992; Van Meter, Yokoi, & Pressley, 1994). My own view is that
instructional research in metacognition should proceed in several
ways. One is the traditional theory-driven approach reflected in the
work of Palincsar and Brown (1984). Another avenue is to utilize in-
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class observations to construct grounded theories of metacognition
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pressley, this volume). Grounded theories
seem especially important at this juncture given the lack of a unified
theory of metacognition. A third approach is to utilize phenomenological methods (Creswell, 1994; Moustakas, 1994) that provide an indepth descriptive accolmt of what effective teachers do to improve
metacognition.
Educators need to assess the effectiveness of their interventions as
well. As I have suggested at several points in this chapter, guidelines
and proven instruments for doing so are lacking. There is much that
teacher-preparation programs could do to enhance future educators'
knowledge of measurement and assessment. However, at present,
many preservice teachers appear to be ill-prepared to meet assessment challenges. At a minimum, classes in reading, science, and
mathematics instruction should include methods for providing a
knowledge base, as well as metacognitive knowledge about regulating that knowledge base. Suggestions for assessing the effectiveness
of both kinds of instruction (i.e., cognitive and metacognitive skills)
should be embedded within this context.
Suggestion 7: Consider the relationship among metacognitive and
affective variables. This suggestion follows from the work of Borkowski
and colleagues (Borkowski . & Muthukrishna, 1992; Borkowski,
Millstead, & Hale, 1988; Borkowski et al., this volume) that describes
the relationship among metacognitive and affective variables. Far less
has been made of these important connections than they deserve (see
Weinert,1987). However, several studies suggest that metacognition
may playa role in increasing personal interest and reducing anxiety
that interferes with task performance (Tobias, 1995; Tobias & Everson,
this volume). Similarly, metacognition may facilitate the understanding and regulation of emotions and possible selves in academic
settings (Borkowski & Thorpe, 1994). Last, Pintrich and colleagues
(Garcia & Pintrich, 1994; Pintrich & DeGroot, 1990; Pintrich et al., this
volume) have elaborated on a number of important connections
between metacognition and motivation.
Summary

This section ha s proposed a broad agenda for translating
metacognitive theory into educa tional practice on a broad scale. This
goa l is ambitious. It will take the better part of a decade under the
bes t of circumstances. The success of this research depends in large
part on the ability of theorists, insh'uctional design experts, and
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specialists in educational measurement to carve out a common agenda.
This agenda should accomplish the following: (a) provide operational
definitions of specific metacognitive skills and their relationship to the
student's knowledge base, (b) construct and evaluate a variety of
outcome measures that can be used to assess these skills, (c) crossvalidate these outcome measures so that they can be used collectively to
conduct multidimensional assessment of metacognitive skills, and (d)
train practicing teachers to teach and evaluate metacognitive skills.
Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to provide an overview of salient
measurement issues that are relevant to the study of metacognition.
Although I believe the construct of metacognition is essential to
understanding human cognition, the past two decades of research
and practice have not achieved the lofty goal of presenting a comprehensive theory of metacognition that can be rendered into educational
practice. It is time to take this goal seriously. The Buros Symposium
on Issues in the Measurement of Metacognition was convened for this
specific purpose. The chapters included in this volume have turned
over many rocks, showing us the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Yet although a call to arms is warranted, it would be misleading
to suggest that the field has reached an impasse. As evidenced by the
chapters in this book, researchers agree on many essential points
regarding metacognitive theory and practice. There is substantial
agreement that the related constructs of metacognition and selfregulation have made an enormous contribution to cognitive psychology, literally changing the way that psychologists and educators
view cognition and development. There also is widespread agreement that it is time to shore-up our knowledge of metacognition with
sound measurement practice.
The separate and combined contributions of this volume point us
in the right direction for substantial progress over the next decade.
Metacognition has much to offer teachers and researchers. I believe
the field of metacognition can deliver on its promise of helping
students at all levels understand their thinking and learning.
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